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I. INTRODUCTION

This post explores the intersection of two topics that have historically been
neglected in interstate water allocation, and in particular in interstate compacts:
groundwater and tribal reserved rights to water. Against the backdrop of the
Agua Calientecase currently before the Ninth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals, which raises the potential for broader recognition of tribal reserved rights
to groundwater, this post focuses on interstate dimensions of recognizing such
rights. Interstate waters may be allocated in three ways: 1) an equitable apportionment decree from the U.S. Supreme Court; 2) legislation by the U.S. Congress that allocates water between states; or 3) interstate compacts. This piece
focuses on how tribal reserved rights have been dealt with under interstate compacts.

II. FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS AND GROUNDWATER
The recognition of federally reserved Indian rights to surface water is well
entrenched in water law jurisprudence, dating back to U.S. Supreme Court
cases such as Witersin 1908. As the Agua Caiiente case before the Ninth
Circuit highlights, tribal reserved rights to groundwater remain less established.
We first set out some background for tribal reserved rights claims to groundwater. Then, we explore the interaction between federally reserved Indian and
state rights to groundwater in the context of interstate allocations.
Even within individual states, the recognition of tribal groundwater claims
may be problematic when addressing the allocation and governance of water
rights. While rights to surface water are well established, tribal rights to groundwater were typically not considered when initial allocations of water rights occurred. Independent of tribal reserved rights, states have experienced difficulty
in formulating regulatory frameworks to conjunctively manage both surface water and groundwater, particularly where different state water rights systems apply
for surface water and groundwater. The introduction of tribal reserved rights
to groundwater, which may predate current claims, could have cascading effects
on long-established uses of water. The displacement of these claims and the
unsettling of long-settled expectations of continued use pose an issue that we
feel should be prophylactically addressed.
I.

INTERSTATE ALLOCATIONS AND FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS

Inconveniently, aquifers do not always follow state lines. In the case of
transboundary aquifers, which extend across two or more states, it is unclear
how federally reserved rights interact with the different states' allocations from
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the aquifer. At least two possible approaches exist: either 1) the federal reserved
right takes priority, with the remaining groundwater allocated between the states;
or 2) the federal allocation is taken from the allocation of the state in which the
federal reserve is located. The Supreme Court followed the latter approach
in Aiizona v. Calitbrnia,which allocated Colorado River water between these
states. In that case, the Special Master upheld the federal government's reserved rights claim to water on behalf of various tribes, and the Special Master
to the U.S. Supreme Court determined in his report that "all consumption of
mainstream water within a state is to be charged to that state, regardless of who
the user may be" (Rifkind, Special Master's Report, at p. 247). Thus, water
used on Indian reservations would be chargeable to the state within which the
use was made. The Supreme Court accepted this analysis, but it did not explain
why.
Nevertheless, while the limited jurisprudence on this issue would take reserved rights from the allocation of the state in which the reservation is located,
ArLzona . Caifornjamay not establish a general rule for the allocation of Indian
water rights. Importantly, it seems that all parties (including the United States)
agreed to this approach, so that the merits of an alternative approach may not
have been ully ventilated. Further, any broadly applicable rule may be limited
by the Special Master's reliance on the specific legal franework in that case,
including the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act and pre-existing federal contracts for the delivery of water in the region.
Of the 24 interstate compacts dealing with the allocation of interstate water
resources listed on the National Center for Interstate Compacts database, only
nine mention Indian rights, and none use the phrase "federally reserved rights."
The compacts that do refer to Indian rights generally do not deal with this issue
beyond a boilerplate acknowledgement that nothing in the compact "shall be
construed as affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian
tribes," such as the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the Klamath River
Compact of 1957.
Unfortunately, should a tribal claim to the use of surface water or groundwater be made, this boilerplate language is not helpful in divining who is responsible for satisfying such rights. One exception to the silence on this issue is the
Snake River Compact, which explicitly states that reserved Indian rights are to
be deducted from the state allotments in which the reservation is located. Similarly, the California-Nevada Compact of 1969, which is not technically in force
as it never gained U.S. Congressional approval, specifically notes that "there is
allocated to Nevada for use on the Walker River Indian Reservation a maximum of 13,000 acre-feet per year."
Charging tribal reserved rights to state allocations, however, is not the only
possible approach. In Montana v. Wyoming, the Special Master noted Montana's position that because the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's water rights predated the Yellowstone River Compact of 1950-they dated to as early as 1881the Tribe's rights should take priority over both states' post-1950 rights. In
1991, Montana and the Tribe had agreed to the Northern Cheyenne-Montana
Compact, which assigned the Tribe a 20,000 acre-foot storage right with a pnority date "equal to the senior-most right for stored water in the Tongue River
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Reservoir," which is April 21, 1937 (Thompson, second interim report, at 158).
Wyoming, however, expressed its concern that Montana should not be able to
"give away" water rights to the Tribe and then ask Wyoming to curtail its own
rights to make up any shortfall for Montana users. Because neither the Tribe
nor the United States were parties to the case, the Special Master did not consider the case to be an appropriate venue to decide the nature of the Tribe's
water rights. Accordingly, this question remains to be decided another day.
Meanwhile, interstate compacts similarly neglect groundwater; only six interstate compacts contain any mention of groundwater, and these references are
fairly cursory. In the Bear River Compact and Klamath River Compact, for
instance, groundwater is mentioned to clarify that it falls outside the scope of
the surface water apportionment in the Compacts. By contrast, the AlabamaCoosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact provides that "Iwlater resources" or
"waters" means "all surface waters and ground waters contained or otherwise
originating within the ACT Basin," signaling an intention that the Compact applies to both sources. The Upper Niobrara River Compact of 1962 treads a
middle ground, as it is confined to surface water apportionment, but expresses
an intention to later apportion groundwater as soon as "adequate data on
ground water of the basin are available." Studies have subsequently been undertaken in the Upper Niobrara Basin, but some fifty years later, the Compact
has not been updated to encompass groundwater. In the absence of express
wording in the relevant compact, the Supreme Court has found that surface
water allocations can be extended to groundwater; this appears to represent the
default position. For instance, in Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court
found that, although the Republican River Compact did not address groundwater, it could be framed to prevent groundwater use within a state that affected
interstate surface water flows.
IV. WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SATISFYING FEDERAL RIGHTS?
Accordingly, how should future courts, and states while negotiating compacts, approach the allocation of liability to satisfy federal reserved rights water
claims? As adverted to above, the dominant theory and practice is that, unless
provided otherwise, reserved rights shall be charged to state allocations. The
possible basis for this approach is the argument that a compact made between
states and ratified by Congress estops Congress from later asserting a federal
interest to modify the specific allocation identified in the compact. This is because compacts are authorized by the Compact Clause in the U.S. Constitution
and then approved by Congress, so they may enjoy some measure of quasiconstitutional status. However, Professor A. Dan Tarlock suggests that this legal
position may be outdated in light of cases suggesting that an interstate compact
cannot limit Congressional exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce
(see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheehn). A related explanation is a pragmatic one
founded in the very purpose of interstate compacts. That is, states enter into
compacts, surrendering some of their sovereignty, to secure certainty of supply.
Allowing later federal claims to modify this allocation would risk upsetting and
reopening established interstate compacts. Professor Tarlock suggests that the
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best approach is to treat Indian claims as "analogous to interstate waters allocated to another state by interstate compact" (Tarlock, at p. 653). This would
involve federal claims being satisfied out of the state's allocation. Within that
framework, he suggests that federal reserved rights would usually take priority

over state uses (see, e.g., Hinderliderv. La Plata& Cherry Creek Ditch Co.).
Conversely, other states have taken the position that satisfaction of Indian
rights is a basin-wide responsibility. There are compelling arguments in support
of this approach; it may be unfair to charge one state with responsibility for
satisfying the entirety of a federal reserved claim to water in a shared water basin
because in some cases, the quantum of the potential federal right may be greater
than the state's entire allocation (as may be the case in Arizona), or federal
claims may aise in relation to already over-allocated basins. This would upset
the affected state's interests under the compact and drastically change the nature
of the bargain struck.
On a principled level, prior federal reserved rights generally preempt all
subsequent state claims. Therefore, it is misleading for a state to talk about
"giving away" water rights, as Wyoming argued in Montana v. W4/oming; because the federal reserved right was never within the state's power to give. Moreover, the concern expressed by the Tribe in that case was that characterizing
their reserved rights as falling within the state's allocation could result in relegation of that right. Although in that case, this concern rests largely on the terms
of the Yellowstone River Compact itself, broader vindication of tribal rights may
weigh in favor of a basin-wide response. This issue arises when we consider the
dynanics of tribal water settlements, which are usually negotiated between the
lederal government, tribes and the relevant state. A state that is required to
satisfy any tribal settlement with its own water allocation alone may be more
likely to take a hard-nosed approach to negotiations than one that has greater
resources available from the basin. Moreover, because the McCarran Anendment of 1952 waives federal sovereign imnmunity for adjudication tribal reserved
water rights, these proceedings often take place in state courts, which have traditionally been seen as less sympathetic to Indian interests than federal courts.
Therefore, any federally reserved allocation arguably should not factor into the
quantity of water that is available for division between states.
This distinction may be easier to draw on paper than in practice, particularly
when states allocate water before federal claims are officially recognized, because it assumes that the federal reserved right is both fixed and quantifiable.
This is not necessarily the case, particularly when states are negotiating compacts where inchoate federal claims exist that have not yet been advanced. That
is, in order to reserve water for potential federal claims, it would be necessary
to first identify the scope of such claims. Moreover, where less information
exists to guide management of groundwater, it may not be feasible to preemptively identifty how much water needs to be set aside to insure against all possible
future claims. This is by no means a straighfforward undertaking, and it would
most likely require engagement with relevant federal and tribal interests. The
risk of this approach is that quantifying federally reserved rights is in itself a
vexed and lengthy process, and so interstate co-management of water basins
could be delayed.
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While these issues complicate the matter, we suggest they are not insurmountable. The existence of federally recognized tribes and reservations overlying groundwater is easily ascertainable, so it may be that, where possible, states

should proactively reserve water based on the "practicably irrigable acreage"
standard. Further, an approach that prioritizes federal reserved rights may well
encourage earlier, more meaningful engagement with tribal stakeholders when
states negotiate water allocations. Ultimately, it is important that tribal water
rights are not undermined through the willful f'ailure of states to address these
issues.

V. CONCLUSION
These issues will only become more'contentious and problematic as demand for water continues to grow, and as a changing climate leads to increasingly drought and scarcity in some parts of the American Southwest. Greater
demands will be placed on already stressed aquifers as groundwater is increasingly looked to as a supplemental source. States should look not only to collaboration with both tribal and private parties, but to other states in attempting
to proactively address these inevitable problems.
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